


SUPPORTING EU INCIDENT RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

Rossella Mattioli **CSIRT Relations Team Expert in Network and Information Security** & proud TALTECH alumni

21 01 2019



ENISA MISSION:

SECURING EUROPE'S INFORMATION SOCIETY



https://www.enisa.europa.eu/






https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/cybersecurity-act-2018-dec-11_en




TODAY POLICY FRAMEWORK





POSITIONING ENISA'S ACTIVITIES

RECOMMENDATIONS ON CYBER SECURITY AND INDEPENDENT **ADVICE**



3

'HANDS-ON' WORK. COLLABORATING WITH OPERATIONAL TEAMS THROUGHOUT EUROPE



SUPPORT

ACROSS EU

MS & EC IN POLICY

IMPLEMENTATION

EXPERTISE

Cloud and Big Data



Critical Infrastructures and Services



CSIRT Services



CSIRTs and communities



CSIRTs in Europe



Cyber Crisis Management



Cyber Exercises



Cyber Security Education



Data Protection



Incident Reporting



IoT and Smart
Infrastructures



National Cyber Security Strategies



Standards and certification



Threat and Risk Management



Trainings for Cyber Security Specialists



Trust Services



https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics



COMMUNITY



http://www.csirtsnetwork.eu/





https://www.enisa.europa.eu/trainings







https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/cyberexercises/





ENISA CSIRT RELATIONS TEAM PORTFOLIO

CSIRTS SITUATION IN EUROPE TODAY

- 383 ENISA Inventory listed teams:
 - teams in CSIRTs Network: 37
 - Trusted Introducer listed:173 out of 174
 - Trusted Introducer accredited: 152 out of 158
 - Trusted Introducer certified: 25 out 25*
 - 7 out of 25 are CSIRTs Network members
 - FIRST members: 175 out of 450



http://enisa.europa.eu/csirts-map



BUILD AND ADVANCE INCIDENT RESPONSE IN EU

73 studies so far:


- CSIRT Setting up Guide in 21 languages
- Incident Management
- Baseline Capabilities of National/Governmental teams
- Maturity assessment framework
- Information sharing Threat Data Actionable information
- Proactive detection of network security incidents monitoring honeypots
- Computer Emergency Response Capabilities for ICS/SCADA
- Cooperation between CERTs and Law Enforcement Agencies -Electronic evidence - interaction with the Judiciary
- Vulnerability Disclosure

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications#c8=CSIRTs



2019 ECONOMICS OF VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE

Economic incentives, motivations and barriers in a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process



Source: ENISA study on the economics of vulnerability disclosure



2019 ECONOMICS OF VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE

Conclusions

- The speed at which major vendors develop and roll out appropriate remediation measures can have direct effects on limiting the impact and costs of attacks.
- The inability or lack of incentives for users to monitor security developments and apply appropriate security updates or patches – even when faced with significant threats
- Stockpiling vulnerabilities can backfire (equities problem).
- More coordinated vulnerability disclosures is needed.

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/economics-of-vulnerability-disclosure



2019 "COOPERATION BETWEEN CSIRT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: INTERACTION WITH THE JUDICIARY":

Conclusions:

- CSIRTs interact much more with LE than with the prosecutors and they interact very rarely with the judiciary
- There are legal provisions on CSIRTs and LE cooperation and their interaction with the judiciary
- The understanding of whether CSIRTs have to report to/inform LE and/or prosecutor of suspicious criminal activities could be improved. Depending on the Member State, the CSIRTs may be obliged or not
- There is need for a more extensive usage of information from CSIRTs in criminal investigations

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/csirts-le-cooperation



2019 "COOPERATION BETWEEN CSIRT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: INTERACTION WITH THE JUDICIARY":

Recommendations:

- ENISA, Europol EC3, Eurojust and CEPOL: to facilitate joint training across the three communities on aspects of their cooperation among the EU and EFTA
- National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and possibly prosecutor services: to work together towards a better mutual understanding of the strengths, needs and limitations of the 3 communities
- National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and possibly prosecutor services: to appoint liaison officers to facilitate the cooperation and the interaction.
- National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and possibly prosecutor services: to investigate
 how the tools they use can be further improved to better receive the information
 provided by other communities and to better formulate their request for information
 addressed to the other communities.





CSIRTS NETWORK

Established by the NIS Directive "in order to contribute to developing confidence and trust between the Member States and to promote swift and effective operational cooperation".

Representatives of the Member States' CSIRTs and CERT-EU can

- cooperate
- exchange information
- build trust
- improve the handling of cross-border incidents
- discuss how to respond in a coordinated manner to specific incidents.



http://www.csirtsnetwork.eu/





members

CERT.at CERT-EU CSIRT Malta

GovCERT Austria NCSC-FI NCSC-NL

AEC CERT-FR CERT POLSKA

CERT.be NCSC (UK) CERT.PT

CERT Bulgaria NCERT-GR CERT-RO

CSIRT-CY CERT ZSIS CERT-SE

CSIRT.CZ CERT.hr SI-CERT

GOVCERT.CZ GovCERT-Hungary CSIRT.SK

CERT-Bund CSIRT-IE SK-CERT

CFCS IT-CERT NCERT.LU

CERT-EE CERT-LT GOVCERT.LU

CCN-CERT CIRCL

CERTSI CERT.LV

ENISA provides the secretariat and actively supports the cooperation among members:

- organizes meetings of the CSIRTs Network
- provides infrastructure
- provides its expertise and advice both to the EC and MS









ENISA TRAININGS SINCE 2008



- Online training material with over 40 trainings made available online, free to use by the community
- Training Courses on site
- Train the trainer programme to scale trainings in the different MS



ENISA TRAININGS PORTFOLIO



Mobile threats incident handling



Triage & basic incident handling



Writing security advisories



Digital forensics



Vulnerability handling



Developing countermeasures



Large scale incident handling



Artifact analysis fundamentals



Identification and handling of electronic evidence



Network forensics



Advanced artifact handling



Automation in incident handling



Setting Up a CSIRT

Incident handling management Recruitment of CSIRT staff Developing CSIRT infrastructure

Technical

Building artefact handling and analysis environment

Processing and storing artifacts

Artefact analysis fundamentals

Advanced artefact handling

Introduction to advanced artefact analysis

Dynamic analysis of artefacts

Static analysis of artefacts

Forensic analysis: Local Incident Response New

Forensic analysis: Network Incident Response New

Forensic analysis: Webserver Analysis New

Developing Countermeasures

Common framework for artefact analysis activities

Using indicators to enhance defence capabilities

Identification and handling of electronic evidence

Digital forensics

Mobile threats incident handling

Mobile threats incident handling (Part II)

Proactive incident detection

Automation in incident handling

Network forensics

Honeypots

Vulnerability handling

Presenting, correlating and filtering various feeds

Operational

Incident handling during an attack on Critical Information Infrastructure

Advanced Persistent Threat incident handling
Social networks used as an attack vector for targeted

Writing Security Advisories

Cost of ICT incident

Incident handling in live role playing

Incident handling in the cloud

Large scale incident handling

Legal and Cooperation

Establishing external contacts

Cooperation with law enforcement

Assessing and Testing Communication Channels with

CERTs and all their stakeholders

Identifying and handling cyber-crime traces

Incident handling and cooperation during phishing campaign

Cooperation in the Area of Cybercrime

CERT participation in incident handling related to the

Article 13a obligations

CERT participation in incident handling related to the Article 4 obligations

3








ENISA training on aviation cybersecurity co-organized with EASA

ATTACK SCENARIO: SCADA SYSTEM COMPROMISE







ENISA training on finance cybersecurity co located with the EU Financial Information Sharing and Analysis Centre FI-ISAC in Athens, Greece in November 2018.



2018 UPDATE OF CSIRT TRAINING MATERIAL OUT this

Introduction to Network Forensics:


- Exercise # 1: ICS/SCADA environment
- Exercise # 2: Detecting exfiltration on a large finance corporation environment
- Exercise #3: Analysis of an airport third-party VPN connection compromise



week!!!

Network forensics





CSIRT CAPABILITIES
DEVELOPMENT AND
MATURITY ASSESSMENT
METHODOLOGY

CSIRT CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT

BASELINING, EVALUATION, IMPROVEMENT

ENISA drives this effort continuously since 2009

In 2016 'How to assess maturity' 3 tier model introduced (basic, intermediate, 'certifiable')

In 2017 ENISA released Maturity Self-assessment Survey Teams can assess their team's maturity instantly


44 questions based on SIM3 model define results

ENISA suggests an additional peer review methodology for CSIRTs Network practice

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirts-in-europe



CSIRTS MATURITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY



ENISA online assessment tool:

- 1. Basic (red)
- 2. Intermediate (yellow)
- 3. 'Certifiable' (green)

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/csirts-maturity-sas



		Assessed matur		
SIM3 Parameter	Parameter description	Current		
0-1	Mandate	0		
0-2	Constituency	0		
0-3	Authority	0		
0-4	Responsibility	0		
0-5	Service Description	0		
0-7	Service Level Description	0		
0-8	Incident Classification	0		
0-9	Participation in Existing CSIRT Frameworks	0		
0-10	Organisational Framework	0		
0-11	Security Policy	0		
H-1	Code of Conduct/Practice/Ethics	0		
H-2	Personal Resilience	0		
H-3	Skillset Description	0		
H-4	Internal Training	0		
H-5	(External) Technical Training	0		
H-6	(External) Communication Training	0		
H-7	External Networking	0		

Online self assessment tool for
incident response teams with
44 parameters covering:

- O Organization
- H Human
- T Tools
- P Processes

Pasic	. 11	iterillediate	Certifiable					
T-1		IT Resources List			0	1	1	1
T-2		Information Source			0	1	2	3
					0	1		
T-3		Consolidated E-ma					2	3
T-4		Incident Tracking S	system		0	1	2	3
T-5		Resilient Phone			0	1	2	3
T-6		Resilient E-mail			0	1	2	3
T-7		Resilient Internet A	ccess		0	1	2	3
T-8		Incident Prevention	Toolset		-1	1	1	1
T-9	E.	Incident Detection	Toolset		0	1	1	1
T-10	0	Incident Resolution	Toolset		0	1	1	2
P-1		Escalation to Gover	nance Level		0	3	3	3
P-2		Escalation to Press	Function		0	1	2	3
P-3	ř.	Escalation to Legal	Function		0	1	2	3
P-4		Incident Prevention	Process		-1	1	2	2
P-5		Incident Detection	Process		1	1	2	2
P-6		Incident Resolution	Process		0	1	2	2
P-7		Specific Incident Pr	rocesses		0	1	2	3
P-8		Audit/Feedback Pro	ocess		0	2	3	4
P-9		Emergency Reacha	bility Process		0	2	3	3
P-10	0	Best Practice Inter	net Presence		0	2	2	2
P-11	1	Secure Information	Handling Process Que	estion	0	2	3	3
P-12	2	Information Source	es Process		0	1	2	3
P-13	3	Outreach Process			0	1	2	3
P-14	4	Reporting Process			0	2	3	4
P-15	5	Statistics Process			-1	1	2	3
P-16	6	Meeting Process			0	1	1	2
P-17	7	Peer-to-Peer Proce	SS		0	1	1	2



Minimum demand for the 3 maturity steps:

Intermediate

```
"values": [
    "entry": [
        "description": "Or 'Unsolicited Bulk Email', this means that the recipient has not granted verifiable permission for the
       "value": "spam"
        "description": "Discreditation or discrimination of somebody, e.g. cyber stalking, racism or threats against one or more
        "expanded": "Harmful Speech",
       "value": "harmful-speech"
        "description": "Child pornography, glorification of violence, etc.",
       "expanded": "Child Porn/Sexual/Violent Content",
       "value": "violence"
    "predicate": "abusive-content"
    "entry": [
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        "description": "Command-and-control server contacted by malware on infected systems.",
        "expanded": "C2 Server",
       "value": "c2-server'
       "description": "URI used for malware distribution, e.g. a download URL included in fake invoice malware spam.",
        "expanded": "Malware Distribution",
        "value": "malware-distribution"
        "description": "URI hosting a malware configuration file, e.g. webinjects for a banking trojan.",
       "expanded": "Malware Configuration",
       "value": "malware-configuration'
```

REFERENCE SECURITY INCIDENT TAXONOMY WORKING GROUP – RSIT WG

REFERENCE INCIDENT TAXONOMY WORKING GROUP – RSIT WG

- ENISA introduced this idea in 2017 to the TF-CSIRT
- 52 participants from 17 MS
- Approved as official TF-CSIRT working group by the TF-CSIRT Steering Committee on 26 September 2018.

TF-CSIRT Hague May 2017

TF-CSIRT Stockholm September 2017 ENISA publishes status report Q4 2017 TF-CSIRT

& FIRST
Regional
Symposium
Europe Hamburg
Feb 2018

TF-CSIRT Warsaw May 2018 RSIT WG GitHub with working version and documentation

TF-CSIRT Vilnius September 2018 TF-CSIRT meeting & FIRST Regional Symposium Europe



VERSION 1

REFERENCE TAXONOMY INCIDENT Taxonomy (human readable version)

This is the Reference Security Incident Classification Taxonomy.

See the machine readable version as well. It should have an identical contents to the human readable version. Note that the 1st column is mandatory, the 2nd column is an optional but desired field.

Version: 1 Generated from machine readable version. Please do not edit this file directly in github, rather use the machinev1 file.

CLASSIFICATION (1ST COLUMN)	INCIDENT EXAMPLES (2ND COLUMN)	Description / Examples
Abusive Content	Spam	Or 'Unsolicited Bulk Email', this means that the recipient has not granted verifiable permission for the message to be sent and that the message is sent as part of a larger collection of messages, all having a functionally comparable content.
Abusive Content	Harmful Speech	Discreditation or discrimination of somebody, e.g. cyber stalking, racism or threats against one or more individuals.
Abusive Content	Child Porn/Sexual /Violent Content	Child pornography, glorification of violence, etc.
Malicious Code	Infected System	System infected with malware, e.g. PC, smartphone or server infected with a rootkit.
Malicious Code	C2 Server	Command-and-control server contacted by malware on infected systems.
Malicious Code	Malware Distribution	URI used for malware distribution, e.g. a download URL included in fake invoice malware spam.
Malicious Code	Malware Configuration	URI hosting a malware configuration file, e.g. webinjects for a banking trojan.
	Mahara DCA	Domain name concerted has a domain concertion algorithm (DCM) and

Next meeting in Wednesday 23rd January 2018 from 15:00 to 17:00 in the Conference Hall. Join us!



Active support and Secretariat

Leading too developmen and maturity assessment

CSIRTs in Europe

CSIRTs map

CSIRTs self Assessment tool



ENISA CSIRTRelations

Team

Reference Security Incident Taxonomy WG



Onsite

CSIRTs
Community
projects and
services

VMs, tutorials

Train the trainers

Sectorial

WHAT WE DO

Foster expertise with reports, trainings and community projects

Provide the secretariat of the CSIRTs Network

Actively support the cooperation among CSIRTs Network members

Facilitate incident exchange and collaboration

Help incident response teams to grow and advance

Support incident response capabilities to protect European citizens



THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

AITAH TALTECH & CERT-EE

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